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Abstract  
According to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her 
credence in p is equal to or greater than a certain threshold. One of the most serious 
challenges for this view is the problem of statistical evidence: statistical evidence is often not 
sufficient to make an outright belief rational, no matter how probable the target proposition is 
given such evidence. This indicates that rational belief is not as sensitive to statistical evidence 
as rational credence. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that, in addition to 
playing a decisive role in rationalizing outright belief, non-statistical evidence also plays a 
preponderant role in rationalizing credence. More precisely, when both types of evidence are 
present in a context, non-statistical evidence should receive a heavier weight than statistical 
evidence in determining rational credence. Second, based on this result, we argue that a 
modified version of the Rational Threshold View can avoid the problem of statistical 
evidence. We conclude by suggesting a possible explanation of the varying sensitivity to 
different types of evidence for belief and credence based on the respective aims of these 
attitudes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Philosophers frequently distinguish between two types of doxastic attitude. On the one hand, there 
is outright belief (hereafter simply “belief”). Beliefs are categorical attitudes, which one can either have 
or fail to have with respect to a given proposition, and which involve dispositions to take the 
believed content for granted in theoretical and practical reasoning and to sincerely assert it. On the 
other hand, there is credence. Credences come in degrees measuring the subject’s strength of 
confidence in a proposition. Degrees of credence are commonly represented by probability 
functions. Each degree of credence is associated with a real number in the interval between 0 and 1, 
where cr(p)=1 represents absolute certainty that p and cr(p)=0 represents absolute certainty that not-
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p. Many also hold that a subject’s credence in a proposition p is rational only if it is proportional to 
the degree of evidential support that that subject has in favor of p.1 Rational credence functions 
ought to conform to probability axioms, and should be updated on new evidence by using 
conditionalization rules. 
What is the relationship, if any, between belief and credence? According to a popular view, the 
so-called Rational Threshold View, a normative relation obtains between these attitudes. This view 
holds that a quite high degree of rational credence reaching a certain threshold is both necessary 
and sufficient for rational belief. A standard formulation of the view is the following:  
 
(RTV) There is a threshold t (0.5<t<1) such that a rational agent believes that p if and only if 
cr(p) ≥ t.2  
 
One motivation for (RTV) stems from the following set of considerations. First, in order to 
rationally believe that p it seems that our credence in p should at least be higher than the credence 
in not-p. Second, if my rational credence in q is higher than that in p, and the degree of credence in 
p is sufficient for rational belief, then intuitively it is also rational for me to believe that q. Third, it 
seems obvious that in order to rationally believe something we do not have to be absolutely certain 
of it. Credence 1 is a too demanding condition for belief (at least if we stick to the interpretation of 
credence 1 as maximal confidence). 
Though quite intuitive, (RTV) is not free from problems. One of the most serious is what we 
may call the problem of statistical evidence.3 According to standard views in epistemology, rational 
credence is insensitive to the distinction between different types of evidence. If statistical evidence is 
the only type of evidence present in a circumstance, this straightforwardly determines the degree of 
rational credence in a proposition—e.g., credence in a proposition p should match the observed 
frequency of p in a relevant reference class. However, a number of intuitive cases seem to show that 
rational belief is not as sensitive to statistical evidence as rational credence. In particular, the cases 
indicate that statistical evidence alone is often not sufficient to justify an outright belief, no matter 
																																																								
1 Easwaran and Fitelson (2015), Foley (2009), Silins (2005).	
2 This view is also often called Lockean Thesis (e.g., Foley, 1993, Ch.4; 2009; Leitgeb, 2014; Locke, 2014; Weatherson, 
2005). The present formulation is from Buchak (2014, p. 289). The Rational Threshold View should not be confused 
with what some philosophers call the Threshold View, the descriptive thesis according to which there is a threshold t 
such that an agent believes p if and only if cr(p) ≥ t. The latter is a descriptive claim about the relationship between the 
two doxastic attitudes, and it is often interpreted as a metaphysical reductivist claim of belief to credence.  
3 For other problems for (RTV), see, e.g., Frankish (2009, pp. 80-81), Buchak (2014), Genin (2019). This paper will not 
be concerned with these further problems. 
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how probable the target proposition is given such evidence.4 The consequence is a straightforward 
violation of (RTV).  
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that, besides playing a decisive role in justifying 
outright beliefs, non-statistical evidence also plays a preponderant role in rationalizing credence. 
More precisely, we provide an analogical argument to the effect that, when both types of evidence 
are available in the same context, statistical evidence plays a significantly reduced role in 
rationalizing credence compared to non-statistical evidence. This result has important consequences 
for how we should conceive rational credence and its relation to evidence. The standard view holds 
that rational credence encodes all sorts of evidential grounds indiscriminately. Furthermore, 
according to this view, credence should be updated on new evidence using typical methods of 
conditionalization which are insensitive to non-formal features of evidence. As a result, qualitative 
differences in evidence cannot make any difference to the result of the update. Our result shows that 
this traditional view is problematic. An account of the influence of evidence on rational credence 
must take into account the asymmetrical rationalizing role of statistical and non-statistical evidence.  
Second, based on the previous result, we show that a modified version of the Rational 
Threshold View can avoid the problem of statistical evidence. Roughly, our suggestion is that the 
threshold for rational belief is on the degree of rational credence provided that such credence is at 
least partially grounded in non-statistical evidence. The presence of non-statistical evidence ensures 
a reduced weight of statistical evidence in rationalizing credence, which in turn explains the reduced 
sensitivity of rational belief to the latter kind of evidence. 
The paper is organized as follows. In §2 we present the problem of statistical evidence in more 
detail. In §3 and §4 we argue respectively for the two main claims introduced above. In §5 we 
conclude by suggesting a possible explanation of the varying sensitivity to different types of evidence 
for belief and credence. Our suggestion is that in order to understand this sensitivity we should look 
at the specific aims and functions of these attitudes. More precisely, we suggest that while belief is 
strongly sensitive to non-statistical evidence because it aims at knowledge, credence has a variable 
sensitivity to different types of evidence because it has two aims: its primary aim is to reach a level 
sufficient to constitute a rational outright belief, while its secondary aim is to minimize the risk of 
error. 
Before proceeding further, an important clarificatory remark about the scope and targets of our 
paper is in order. RTV has been widely discussed in formal epistemology as a promising way of 
accommodating outright beliefs within a Bayesian formal apparatus. However, the debate on RTV 
has traditionally developed within less formal domains of philosophy, such as the philosophy of 																																																								
4 A terminological note: in this paper we will use ‘justified belief’ and ‘rational belief’ as interchangeable terms referring 
to what a reasonable person ought to believe in their circumstances. For a similar use see Buchak (2014, pp. 287-288). 
	 4	
mind and traditional epistemology. Philosophical theorizing about the RTV presupposes a gradable 
notion of rational credence, but doesn’t rely on the presupposition of a probabilistic (Bayesian) 
representation of this gradability. While it is quite natural to interpret degrees of rational credence 
as probabilities, this interpretation is neither a precondition of RTV, nor a necessary assumption in 
the main arguments given in its support. That said, we would like to stress that the proposals we are 
going to defend in this article—our account of rational credence in §3 and the modified RTV in 
§4—are consistent with a Bayesian framework in which degrees of credence are conceived as 
probability functions and are updated using standard conditionalization methods. We will come 
back to this point in §3.1, where we will say more on how our proposal could be framed within a 
Bayesian picture. 
 
 
 
2. The problem of statistical evidence 
 
The problem of statistical evidence for (RTV) consists in the fact that rational belief is not as 
sensitive to statistical evidence as rational credence. While mere statistical considerations directly 
determine the degree of credence that a rational subject should have, they are not sufficient alone to 
justify an outright belief, no matter how strong the probabilistic support of such considerations to 
the target proposition is. As a result, there are possible cases in which statistical evidence supports an 
extremely high degree of credence in a proposition p, but the subject is not justified to believe that p, 
and, conversely, cases in which a subject is justified to believe that p though the degree of rational 
credence is significantly lower.  
Before illustrating the problem with specific cases, it is helpful to provide a rough 
characterization of the distinction between statistical and non-statistical evidence. Let’s call statistical 
evidence all evidence grounded on merely statistical considerations, e.g., considerations about the 
frequency that a certain fact or event has been or will be the case. For example, that the weather 
forecast said that tomorrow there is a 90% chance of rain is statistical evidence that it will rain; and 
that there are one thousand tickets in a fair lottery is statistical evidence that my ticket will not be 
the winner. Non-statistical evidence is based on considerations that are not merely statistical. That I see 
bright light out of the window is evidence that it is sunny. The propositions that it is sunny and that 
I see the light are related in a way that is not merely statistical. A possible way of putting this 
connection is in counterfactual terms: the counterfactual “if it hadn’t been sunny, I wouldn’t have 
seen the light out of the window” is true if it is sunny, but the counterfactual “if I had won the 
lottery, there would not have been one thousand lottery tickets” is false, and this is regardless of 
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whether I won the lottery or not. Another way is to attribute to evidence a causal or explanatory 
connection with the proposition it supports: while the fact that it is sunny can explain why I see the 
light outside the window, that my lottery ticket is not the winner cannot explain the fact that there 
are one thousand lottery tickets.5 
Martin Smith (2016, §2.3) proposes a useful test for discriminating statistical and non-statistical 
evidence. His idea is that only non-statistical evidence provides a specific type of support, that he 
calls normic. According to Smith “a body of evidence E normically supports a proposition P just in 
case the circumstance in which E is true and P is false requires more explanation than the 
circumstance in which E and P are both true” (2016, p. 40). If non-statistical evidence supports a 
certain proposition p, in all normal circumstances p is also the case, and if p turns out to be false 
there should be some explanation for why p is not the case. On the contrary, if mere statistical 
evidence supports p, cases in which p is false, even though less probable, are as normal as the ones in 
which p is true. If p turned out to be false despite statistical evidence to the contrary, no special 
explanation of this error would be needed. For example, suppose I believe that Matthew is on 
holiday based on the fact that he told me so and I know he is normally very trustworthy. If this 
belief turned out to be false then, given the evidence upon which it is based, there needs to be some 
explanation for why Matthew is not on holiday despite the evidence—for example, due to an 
emergency situation at the office, Matthew’s boss asked him to push back his holidays for some 
days. However, if based on mere statistical evidence I believe that my lottery ticket is a loser and this 
turns out to be false, there would be no need of explanation for the error. The possibility that my 
ticket is the winner is as normal a possibility as the one in which it is a loser (though a less probable 
one). 
A couple of further remarks are in order here. First, from a formal point of view, statistical 
correlations are indistinguishable from other non-statistical properties such as modal, causal and 
explanatory relations.6 A consequence is that, as some authors have observed, we are not going to 
be able to read off the type of evidence from purely formal features of one’s credal state.7 Instead we 
need to look at other (modal, causal or explanatory) features of the world in order to establish 
whether a piece of evidence is statistical or non-statistical. Second, saying that non-statistical 
evidence doesn’t rely on mere statistical or frequency-based considerations doesn’t mean that non-
statistical evidence for p doesn’t provide probabilistic support for p. Obviously, that I see bright light 																																																								
5 Buchak (2014, p. 294) considers counterfactual and causal accounts of non-statistical evidence. See also Bird (2007, pp. 
101-102); Nelkin (2000, p. 397). See Belkoniene (2019) for a recent explanationist approach to the problem of statistical 
evidence. For similar accounts in the legal domain see, for example, Di Bello (2013); Enoch et al. (2012); Thompson 
(1986).  
6 Here with ‘formal’ we roughly mean that can be defined in terms that are probabilistic or broadly logical (Douven & 
Williamson, 2006, p. 758). For a similar use of ‘formal’ see also Buchak (2014); Staffel (2016). 7	E.g., Buchak (2014, p. 294); Spirtes et al. (1996); Staffel (2016, p. 1733).	
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out of the window makes it likely for me that it is sunny—or at least, assuming that I previously 
ignored whether it was sunny, my seeing bright light makes it more likely than before. We suggest 
conceiving non-statistical evidence as involving further features in addition to probabilistic support. In 
this respect, non-statistical evidence is something more than mere statistical evidence.8  
The problem of statistical evidence is well illustrated by paradigmatic examples showing the 
lack of correlation between high degrees of rational confidence and outright rational belief. 
Consider the following example (Nelkin, 2000, pp. 388-389; Smith, 2010, pp. 13-14):9 
 
(Background color) Suppose that I have a computer program that chooses a background 
color for my computer screen by randomly selecting a number between one and one million 
each time I turn on my computer. Associated with one of the numbers is a red screen. 
Associated with 999,999 numbers is a blue screen. One day I turn on my computer and then 
go into the next room to attend to something else. In the meantime Bruce, who knows 
nothing about how my computer’s background color is determined, wanders into the 
computer room and sees that the computer is displaying a blue background. 
 
Intuitively, I ought not to outright believe that the background is blue—even though I should 
believe that it’s overwhelmingly likely that the background is blue. But it seems perfectly rational for 
Bruce to believe that it is blue. However, given Bruce’s perceptual evidence, the probability that the 
computer is displaying a blue background would be nowhere near as high as how likely the 
proposition is given my evidence (i.e. 99.9999%). The chance that he could be hallucinating or have 
been struck by colour blindness is surely higher than my risk of error. 
Buchak (2014, pp. 290-291) considers pairs of scenarios in which practical stakes and other 
contextual factors are identical, but the subject possesses different types of evidence:10 
 
(Blue Bus) It is late at night and an individual’s car is hit by a bus. This individual cannot 
identify the bus. 95% of the buses circulating in the area at the time of the accident are 
operated by the Blue Bus Company, 5% are operated by the Green Bus Company, and there 
are no buses in the vicinity except those operated by one of these two companies. Each of the 
other elements of the case – negligence, causation, and, especially, the fact and the extent of 
the injury – is either stipulated or established to a virtual certainty. 																																																								
8 See Buchak (2014, p. 294), Smith (2016, p. 7). Thanks to Martin Smith for encouraging us to clarify these points.  
9 For other examples, see Buchak (2014, pp. 290-295); Nelkin (2000); Smith (2010; 2016); Williamson (2000, pp. 98-99). 
10	The examples reported in the text are simplifications of the cases originally reported by Buchak (2014). For a 
discussion see also Staffel (2016). Buchak borrows these cases from classic examples in philosophy of laws used to outline 
the so-called ‘problem of naked statistical evidence’. 
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(Green Bus) It is late at night and an individual’s car is hit by a bus. This individual cannot 
identify the bus. There is an eyewitness who identifies the bus as belonging to the Green Bus 
Company (the two bus companies operate busses with distinctive shapes). It is night-time, and 
so her vision is not ideal: let us say that in conditions like that in which the accident took place 
she makes mistakes 10% of the time.11 All of the other elements of the case remain the same. 
 
According to Buchak, upon reflection on the evidence available in these cases, in (Blue Bus) we 
don’t have sufficient evidence to form a rational belief about whether a Blue Bus hit the car, but in 
(Green Bus) we do. Intuitively, even though the chance of being mistaken given the available 
evidence is greater in (Green Bus) than in (Blue Bus), it is not rational to believe that a Blue Bus hit 
the car in (Blue Bus), while in (Green Bus) it seems rational to believe that a Green Bus hit the car.12 
However, if the rational credence of a subject in a proposition p should exactly match the frequency 
or propensity that p in the relevant reference class, rational credence in the proposition supported 
by evidence should be higher in (Blue Bus) than in (Green Bus).  
Generalizing from the above examples, it is possible to build pairs of cases A and B such that in 
A the degree of rational credence is higher than in B, but the subject is rational to believe in B but 
not in A (or at least more rational to believe in B than in A). These cases constitute a direct 
refutation of (RTV).13 Buchak’s diagnosis of this and other similar cases is that statistical evidence 
can give rise to a high degree of rational credence, and maybe it can also rationalize beliefs about 
the chance of a proposition being true, but it is often not enough by itself to justify a belief in the 
target proposition. In most cases, some non-statistical evidence is necessary. She concludes that the 
Rational Threshold View fails because rational belief and rational credence are sensitive to different 
features of evidence (ibid., pp. 295-296). As the above cases show, while standards of rationality for 
credence don’t distinguish between statistical and non-statistical evidence, standards of rationality 
for belief give a straightforward priority to non-statistical evidence over statistical evidence.  																																																								
11 While we have followed other presentations of the case, it is worthwhile to dispel potential ambiguities in the sentence 
“in conditions like that in which the accident took place she makes mistakes 10% of the time”. What this sentence 
means is not that the probability that the bus involved really was a Green Bus bus, given the witness testimony, is as 
high as 90% (Pr(GB|E)=0.9), but that the witness correctly identifies the color of the bus 90% of the time (Pr(E|∼BB) = 
0.9) and incorrectly identifies the opposite color 10% of the time (Pr(E|BB) = 0.1). Observe also that probabilities in 
(Blue Bus) and (Green Bus) range over the same reference class. This excludes approaches to the problem based on 
principles of direct inference distinguishing between singular and generic probabilities (e.g., Niiniluoto, 1981). Thanks to 
Richard Pettigrew for directing our attention to these important details about the cases. 
12 If you don’t share this intuition, feel free to change the percentages in the two examples to a degree that is enough to 
make reasonable a belief in (Green Bus). 
13 Buchak rightly observes that this conclusion is valid also for variable threshold views, since her cases do not involve 
differences in stakes or other practical factors that may influence a variation of the threshold. The cases are identical 
under all practical respects. 
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Though we agree that the problem of statistical evidence undermines classical unqualified 
versions of the Rational Threshold View, we think that revised versions of this principle can be 
maintained. We also partially disagree with Buchak’s conclusion that rational belief and rational 
credence are systematically sensitive to different features of evidence. In the next section we argue 
that in certain contexts also rational credence is sensitive to the difference between statistical and 
non-statistical evidence. 
 
 
3. Confidence and statistical evidence 
 
Our argument starts from the consideration of a range of intuitive cases. Such cases are in all 
relevant respects analogous to those generating the problem of statistical evidence, except that they 
concern credence rather than outright belief. The cases trigger the intuition that rational credence is 
sensitive to the difference between statistical and non-statistical evidence. More precisely, they 
suggest that in contexts in which there is both statistical and non-statistical evidence, the former 
plays a significantly reduced role in determining the degree of rational credence compared to the 
latter. The argument proceeds by analogy: given that differences between the two sorts of cases are 
unsubstantial, if from belief-cases considered in §2 it is licit to infer that rational belief is 
asymmetrically sensitive to the two types of evidence, it is also licit to infer a similar conclusion for 
rational credence from analogous credence-cases. The conclusion is that for credence, as for belief, 
non-statistical evidence plays a prominent role in determining which attitude it is rational to have. 
In §3.1 we introduce the argument. We also briefly outline a specific account of how statistical 
and non-statistical evidence combine to determine rational credence, which is naturally suggested 
by a consideration of the intuitive cases. In §3.2 we consider an important objection to the argument 
and provide some replies to it.  
 
3.1. The argument 
As anticipated in the introduction, according to standard views in epistemology, rational credence 
that p encodes all sorts of evidential grounds in support of or against p, indiscriminately treating all 
types of evidence on a par. Credence probability functions update new evidence using typical 
methods of conditionalization which are insensitive to qualitative, non-formal features of evidence 
such as counterfactual, causal or explanatory properties specific to non-statistical evidence. As a 
result, qualitative differences in the evidence don’t make any difference to the result of the update. 
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Reflection on a specific range of cases suggests that this standard view is incorrect.14  When we 
consider circumstances in which both statistical and non-statistical evidence are available, it 
becomes apparent that the two types of evidence don’t contribute evenly in determining rational 
credence. In such cases, non-statistical considerations seem to have a dominant weight in 
determining the degree of rational credence. 
Consider the following case adapted from the Blue Bus/Green Bus examples: 
 
(Blue Bus Updated) The scenario is initially the same as in (Blue Bus): there is statistical 
evidence that 95% of the buses in the area at the time of the accident are operated by the Blue 
Bus Company, while only 5% are operated by the Green Bus Company. However, at a later 
time new independent evidence becomes available: an eyewitness identifies the bus as belonging 
to the Green Bus Company. As in (Green Bus), the reliability of the eyewitness’s vision is 90% 
(viz., in relevantly similar circumstances the witness incorrectly identifies the type of bus 10% of 
the time and correctly identifies it 90% of the times). 
 
If we update new evidence following Bayesian conditionalization, we have the following result—
where E is the new eyewitness’s testimony, S is the statistical evidence, BB is the claim that the bus 
that caused the accident was a Blue Bus:15 
 
cr(BB|E&S) = !"(!|!!&#) × !"(!!|!) !"(!|!!&#) × !"(!!|!) ! !"(!|~!!&#) × !"(~!!|!) = !.! × !.!" !.! × !.!" ! !.! × !.!" = !.!"#!.!"  ≈ 0.68 
 
According to this result, the rational credence that the bus that caused the accident was a Blue Bus 
given the new evidence is approximately 0.68. Thus our overall rational confidence should quite 
neatly favor BB over GB. However, this result seems very counterintuitive. Rather, when presented 
with the above case, people tend to react with the same sort of intuition as in the original Bus cases: 
it seems much more rational to trust the eyewitness’s testimony than mere statistical 
considerations.16 Consider a court case trying to establish which bus company caused the accident. 																																																								
14	It is important to stress here that our aim in this paper is not to provide an argument against Bayesianism and its 
methods of belief updating. We will say more on this below.  
15 Buchak (2014, pp. 294-295 and fn. 23) and Smith (2016, §4.3) discuss the same case and use the same updating 
method. An assumption in the calculation, also implicit in Buchak and Smith’s presentations, is that the agent knows 
and assigns maximal credence to the proposition that the statistical evidence is true. This implies that cr(E|BB&S) = 
cr(E|BB) and cr(E|∼BB&S) = cr(E|∼BB).  	
16 Such intuitive judgments have been repeatedly confirmed by experimental studies. See for example Kahneman & 
Tversky (1972); Lyon & Slovic (1976). While these psychologists have interpreted such data as symptomatic of a base 
rate fallacy, many other psychologists and philosophers disagree on such interpretation of the data. See, for example, 
Cohen (1981); Koehler (1996); Levi (1981). See §3.2 for considerations against identifying such cases with cases of base 
rate fallacy. 
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It seems clear that, if the court is in a situation of forced decision or must provide their own opinion 
about which company should pay for the car damage, it will trust the eyewitness more than 
statistical considerations. Consider then other dispositions and responses commonly associated with 
confidence, such as suspicion, inclination and conjecture: in (Blue Bus Updated) intuitively it seems 
perfectly appropriate to suspect that the bus that caused the accident was a Green Bus, and to be 
inclined to conjecture accordingly. All these considerations indicate that, intuitively, in (Blue Bus 
Updated) the degree of credence that it is reasonable to have in GB should be higher than in BB, 
even though the probabilistic support provided by statistical evidence is stronger than that provided 
by non-statistical evidence.  
Consider another case: 
 
(Background color-2) Suppose that I have a computer program that chooses a background 
color for my computer screen by randomly selecting a number between one and one thousand 
each time I turn on my computer. Associated with one of the numbers is a green screen. 
Associated with 999 numbers is a blue screen. One day I turn on my computer and then go 
into the next room to attend to something else. In the meantime Bruce, who knows nothing 
about how the computer’s background color is determined, wanders into the computer room 
and looks at the screen. Then he comes into my room and tells me that the computer is 
displaying a green background. Though Bruce is a quite reliable person, we can assume that 
in such situations his testimony will be unreliable at least once every 100 times (i.e., he will 
incorrectly report the color 1% of the time and correctly report 99% of the times). 
 
By updating the new evidence (again using Bayesian conditionalization), we should conclude that 
my rational credence that the screen is blue should be much higher than that it is green. More 
precisely, it should be ≈ 0.9,17 which is just slightly lower than the initial rational credence. This 
result, again, sounds absurd. Maybe Bruce’s testimony is insufficient to rationalize an outright belief 
that the screen is green, but intuitively it seems clear that my rational confidence should lean more 
in favor of the claim that the screen is green than the contrary. In any case, after Bruce’s testimony 
it seems at least rationally permissible to stop being very confident that the screen is blue and 
become almost equally unconfident in the two possibilities, to claim that I have no idea now what 
the color of the screen is, and to avoid conjectures about it. 
																																																								
17 Where BB is that the background is blue, S is the statistical evidence, T is Bruce’s testimony: cr(BB|T&S) = 
cr(T|BB&S) × cr(BB|S) / [cr(T|BB&S) × cr(BB|S) + cr(T|∼BB&S) × cr(∼BB|S)] = (0.01) × (0.999) / [(0.01) × (0.999) 
+ (0.99) × (0.001)] = 0.00999 / 0.01098 ≈ 0.91 
	 11	
We could introduce here other examples eliciting similar intuitive judgments. Instead, we 
suggest a general method to construct such cases. The method is quite simple: take any of the 
examples in the literature used to illustrate the problem of statistical evidence and reformulate them 
making sure that (i) the two kinds of evidence support opposite conclusions, and (ii) both statistical 
and non-statistical evidence are present in the same circumstance and available to the same 
subject.18 In addition to providing a general template for new cases illustrating the point, the present 
method also indicates important similarities between these cases and those considered in §2. Indeed, 
such similarities are so deep that we can conceive some of these cases as a subset of those used to 
illustrate the problem of statistical evidence. The main difference is that we now look at our intuitive 
judgments about the subject’s rational confidence rather than about her rational belief. The 
resulting intuitions are exactly the same: non-statistical evidence seems to have a heavier weight 
than statistical evidence in the determination of both rational belief and rational credence. 
Importantly, the differences between the two types of case do not seem substantive enough to 
motivate different explanations of the respective intuitive judgments. On the contrary, the sorts of 
intuitions triggered in the two types of case are sufficiently similar to suggest a common explanation. 
Of course, separate accounts are possible—for example an account relying on the nature of belief 
for cases considered in §2 and one appealing to ambiguity or under-specification in the formulation 
of cases involving mere credence.19 However, given the substantial similarities, if a common type of 
explanation were available this would be by far preferable, more parsimonious, intuitive and less ad 
hoc. A common explanation would also avoid the risk of radically divorcing the conditions for 
rational belief and rational confidence. Such a divorce would have counterintuitive consequences 
such as the possibility of rationally believing p while having low reasonable confidence that p (we will 
come back to this and other undesirable consequences in §3.2).  
Such a common explanation is available. We can apply to the present cases an explanation 
similar to the one that other philosophers have considered for the cases discussed in §2: like rational 
belief, also rational credence is sensitive to differences between statistical and non-statistical 
evidence. For credence, as for belief, non-statistical evidence plays a prominent role in determining 
which attitude it is rational to have in the relevant cases. 
According to the suggested explanation, in contexts in which both statistical and non-statistical 
evidence are present, the latter has a relatively heavier weight compared to statistical evidence in 
determining the degree of credence of a rational subject. However, this doesn’t exclude a 
rationalizing role of statistical evidence for credence. On the one hand, when only statistical 																																																								18	Several cases in the literature already happen to satisfy these two conditions. See Gardiner (2019) for examples.	
19 For explanations appealing to a lack of specificity in the information relevant to determine base rates see Levi (1981); 
Colyvan et al. (2001). 
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evidence for a proposition is available, this evidence seems to directly determine the degree of 
rational credence that a subject should have in that proposition.20 For example, if the only available 
evidence is that there is 60% probability that it will rain, it is rational to form credence .6 that it will 
rain. On the other hand, when non-statistical evidence is also available, statistical evidence can 
either weaken or reinforce the rational confidence of the subject. For example, that a DNA test 
indicates that the suspect was on the crime scene, in combination with some other non-statistical 
evidence (e.g., a potential motive to commit the crime) may lead to a higher degree of rational 
credence (and eventually to a belief) in the suspect’s guilt.21 
How do different types of evidence interact in determining rational credence? Our previous 
discussion suggests that the support of statistical evidence to a proposition is contextually variable. 
When both types of evidence are available in a context, the support provided by statistical evidence 
is partially defeated or screened off by that of non-statistical evidence. In these circumstances, 
rational credence is the result of a complex function that gives a heavier weight to the support of 
non-statistical evidence over that of statistical evidence. How precisely the respective support of the 
two types of evidence should be weighed in the determination of rational credence is a difficult 
question that unfortunately we cannot answer here. Importantly, this asymmetric weight function 
would apply only when both types of evidence for the same proposition are present. If there is only 
statistical evidence for p, this evidence will determine the degree of rational credence in p without 
that its support be screened off or diminished.22  
Before proceeding further, we would like to add a clarification and address a potential worry. 
First, the clarification: while our present proposal diverges in important ways from standard 
accounts of rational credence in formal epistemology, our aim in this paper is not to provide an 
argument against Bayesianism and its methods of credence updating. On the contrary, we would 
like to stress that our proposal is fully consistent with the standard Bayesian formal apparatus. 
Nothing in our account hinders a probabilistic representation of degrees of credence. The proposal 
is also compatible with updating rational credence using standard conditionalization methods. The 
only point of disagreement with the standard Bayesian picture is that we do not think that credence 
updating should be uniquely sensitive to statistical features of evidence. Our suggestion is that the 																																																								
20 Cohen (1981, p. 329) makes the same point when he says that when no causal propensity is at issue, the only basis for 
estimating the required probability is the relative frequency. See Lyon & Slovic (1976, p. 294) and Tversky & 
Kahneman (1980, p. 63) for empirical studies confirming this tendency. This is also the intuition behind Lewis’ Principal 
Principle according to which rational agents conform their credences to chances. 
21 We are here assuming that the result of the DNA test provides mere statistical evidence. We are aware that this is 
contentious. The reader is free to replace the example with one she or he finds more appropriate. For a defense of the 
claim that DNA profiling is properly characterized as statistical evidence see Ross (2019, §3).  
22 We do not exclude that evidential support can vary contextually depending on practical factors. For example, where 
a lot turns on whether p (e.g., in a court case deciding whether to condemn a person to a life sentence), it may be 
rational to rely less on statistical considerations than in more relaxed and ordinary contexts. 
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standard Bayesian machinery should be supplemented by additional constraints that take into 
account specific qualitative features of evidence.23 These constraints do not concern the methods for 
belief updating but the specific weight attributed to different features of evidence. As explained 
above, the evidential input in conditionalization should be a complex factor in which statistical and 
non-statistical components of evidence should receive different weights in different contexts.24 
However, as long as this input is probabilistically coherent, rational credence can be updated by 
conditionalization in the light of new evidence, and the result will be a probability function.  
The potential worry is the following.25 In assessing confidence in the above cases we mainly 
focused on phenomenological and behavioral dispositions commonly associated with this type of 
attitude, such as introspective appraisals, suspicion, conjecture, and tendencies in forced choice. 
However, we didn’t consider another type of disposition traditionally associated with confidence, 
namely, betting behaviors. If we consider our betting dispositions in the above cases, our intuitions 
are unclear. For instance, it is not at all clear that in (Blue Bus Updated), if one is offered a bet on 
which bus caused the accident, the right response would be to bet on a Green Bus. After all, from a 
statistical perspective, it is more probable that a Blue Bus caused the accident. Thus we would be 
more likely to win the gamble by betting on the latter option.  
In response, we disagree that explicit betting dispositions constitute a good test to assess our 
(rational) degrees of confidence. The early Bayesian idea that degrees of belief can be read off a 
subject’s betting dispositions reflects the influence of historical views such as logical positivism and 
behaviourism. However, more recently the thought that explicit betting behavior gives a reliable 
measure of one’s credence has been the target of important criticisms. Some have argued that 
betting dispositions are heavily affected by factors other than credences, such as risk aversion, 
motives besides money, and the format of the bet (e.g., Earman, 1992; Weatherson, 1999; 
Christensen, 2001; Eriksson & Hájek, 2007). Others have pointed out that the very practice of 
gambling involves prudential and moral dimensions that inevitably misrepresent our actual degree 
of confidence (Fassio, forthcoming, Salas, 2019). Moreover, several authors have argued that betting 
scenarios involve features that almost inevitably affect one’s doxastic states and evidence, thereby 
modifying one’s initial epistemic position. A consequence is that the degrees of (rational) confidence 
that guide an agent’s choices in gambling cannot reflect the ones that the agent has toward a given 																																																								
23 In a footnote, Buchak (2014, fn. 21) briefly suggests that one could try to add more to the structure of credence 
functions in order to implement in it qualitative features such as the difference between causation and correlation. She 
says that “If one wants to take these escape route, it will be an interesting upshot of the argument here that rational 
agents need to have much more complex credences than is ordinarily supposed”. This is precisely what the 
implementation of our proposal in a Bayesian framework would look like. 24	A possible way to implement the above proposal is to use Jeffrey conditionalization method for calibrating the 
weighted support of different types of evidence for a hypothesis. See Lehrer (1986, pp. 13-20) for a similar use. 25	We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to address this important worry.	
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proposition in normal contexts (Dodd, 2017; Eriksson and Rabinowicz, 2013; Fassio, forthcoming, 
Hacking, 1965, pp. 206-207; Salas, 2019). 
In our view, betting dispositions are the expression of what Martin Smith (2016, §4.3) calls 
probability estimates. According to Smith, these are “one kind of specialised judgment that we can 
choose to make about a proposition, but they are not a foundational aspect of our intellectual lives, 
and are as separate from degrees of confidence and degrees of belief as they are from outright 
belief” (2016, p. 84, fn. 6).	We can conceive probability estimates as beliefs about what one takes to 
be probable given mere statistical considerations. Our betting dispositions would then be guided by 
a specific kind of probability estimate, concerning what we take to be statistically probable 
conditional on a certain kind of bet being proposed. Betting scenarios are contexts in which we are 
asked to provide a statistical evaluation of the circumstances and then take a gamble. For instance, 
when presented with a bet on whether the bus that caused the accident was Blue or Green, we are 
asked to estimate the statistical distribution of the respective events occurring (conditional on that 
bet being proposed). In providing such estimate, our focus is on statistical features of evidence only. 
Non-statistical features are irrelevant in that context.26 
 
 
 
3.2. An objection and replies 
Someone may object that our intuitive diagnosis of the cases commits a base rate fallacy.27 This fallacy 
is a specific error of probabilistic reasoning consisting of neglecting base rate information when 
estimating how probable a hypothesis is made by a body of evidence.28 Suppose, for instance, that 
the incidence of a particular disease in the population is 1 in 10,000. And suppose we know that the 
test for it has a 1% false positive rate—i.e., it delivers a wrong prediction that the person has the 
disease one in 100 times. Now suppose that Kate goes to a clinic where the test is administered. She 
tests positive. What should be our credence that she has the disease? In similar cases most people 
tend to fallaciously ignore the initial statistical evidence (namely, knowledge of the incidence of the 
disease) and pay much more attention to the result of the test, which presumably is counterfactually 																																																								26	In our view, there is a principled reason why our betting behavior should be guided by probability estimates rather 
than other doxastic attitudes sensitive to non-statistical features of evidence. As we shall argue in §5, sensitivity to non-
statistical evidence (for both credence and belief) is aimed at acquiring the causal and counterfactual support necessary 
for knowledge. By contrast, when we want to place a bet, we do not aim at knowledge, but exclusively at reducing the 
risk of error. This goal is better served by probability estimates exclusively sensitive to statistical considerations. 
Probability estimates are also the relevant kind of attitudes we should consider when we focus on a range of probabilistic 
fallacies, such as the Base Rate Fallacy. We will be back to this issue in the next subsection. 
27 Thanks to Richard Pettigrew and Julien Dutant for bringing this possible objection to our attention. The example 
considered in the text has been suggested to us by Pettigrew. A similar case study was first considered by Hammerton 
(1973). 
28 See, for example, Kahneman & Tversky (1972).  
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related to the disease. In this case, people tend to consider it highly probable that Kate has the 
disease. Even though this is what people typically say in response to this example, it is usually 
accepted that they are committing a fallacy, and they should instead update new evidence using 
standard statistical methods such as Bayes conditionalization and set their credence below 1%.29  
One problem with this objection is that it assumes that the above example is analogous to the 
cases considered in §3.1. More precisely, the objection assumes that because there is a 
counterfactual correlation between the positivity to the test and the disease, this evidence should be 
considered non-statistical. However, the counterfactual correlation is not to the proposition that 
Kate has the disease, but to the higher probability that this proposition is true (99%).30 Once we 
realize this, it becomes clear that the new evidence cannot be treated as non-statistical like that in 
(Blue Bus Updated) and (Background color-2). Consider Smith’s test for discriminating between 
statistical and non-statistical evidence. If non-statistical evidence supports a certain proposition p, 
more explanation is needed if p ends up to be false than if it ends up to be true. Normal conditions 
require less explanation than abnormal conditions do. We can easily see that the evidence provided 
by the medical test doesn’t fulfill this condition: the positivity of the test just indicates that the person 
is more likely to have the disease, but if she ended up not having the disease, no special explanation 
would be needed. The case in which the person does not have the disease is as normal as one in 
which she has the disease—even though relatively less probable. Therefore, evidence in such 
paradigmatic examples of base rate fallacy is all purely statistical, and thus when the new evidence is 
updated the weight of the old evidence shouldn’t be reduced. In this respect, such cases are 
importantly different from those considered in §3.1, which involve non-statistical evidence. Our 
account of the latter cases is compatible with predicting a base rate fallacy in the medical test 
example as well as in all other paradigmatic base rate fallacy cases.31 
One may insist that the base rate fallacy does not only affect cases involving mere statistical 
evidence, such as the medical test example, but also cases such as (Blue Bus Updated), in which the 
updated evidence is non-statistical. Indeed, early psychological studies testing the fallacy used 
																																																								
29 More precisely, by conditionalization (using Bayes theorem), we obtain that the probability that Kate has the disease 
is ≈ 0.0098 (assuming that the false negative rate is zero for the same result). It is worth mentioning that the reality of 
such a fallacy has been seriously challenged in recent years. See for example Koehler (1996), who challenges studies 
supporting the fallacy’s existence from empirical, methodological and normative standpoints. 
30 Krantz (1981, p. 341) correctly observes that in this type of case both pieces of information are simple population 
frequencies. 
31 Incidentally, our account can also provide an explanation of the biased intuitions in base rate fallacy cases. Even 
though the evidence provided by the medical test is merely statistical, it is counterfactually related to a certain 
probabilistic distribution. The higher frequency of illness if the test is positive can be explained by this counterfactual 
correlation. The cause of the bias may be due to a confusion of counterfactual correlations of frequencies with 
counterfactual correlations of non-probabilistic facts. While the latter type of correlation is a condition for non-statistical 
evidence (and can be used to test whether a certain piece of evidence is non-statistical), the former correlation is not.   
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precisely this type of case.32 However, there are reasons to resist equating such cases to less 
contentious cases of base rate fallacy. First, several psychologists recognize that cases updating on 
non-statistical evidence involve factors not specific to typical base rate fallacy cases, which can taint 
the experimental results. Koehler (1996, pp. 8-10) notes that such cases are sensitive to the relative 
diagnosticity of the information and the reliability of the information source, factors concerning the 
qualitative content or the source of information rather than its form. Sensitivity to these factors is 
deemed by most psychologists to be perfectly appropriate even from a normative point of view, 
manifesting a genuine aspect of human rationality (e.g., Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Cohen, 1981; 
Koehler, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). 33  Importantly, such factors are also indicative of 
explanatory and modal correlations characteristic of non-statistical evidence.  
Second, psychological studies have confirmed that in cases like (Blue Bus Updated), intuitive 
judgments are much more robust and impervious to variations in the topic, numerical details and 
sequential formulations of the story told to the subjects than in other cases such as the medical test 
example.34 These differences can be easily explained if we avoid trying to reduce all the cases to a 
common fallacy and we start recognizing the important role of qualitative evidential differences in 
the rationalization of belief and credence.35  
Third, in the previous section we introduced a distinction between probability estimates and 
credences. Martin Smith (2016, §4.3) has argued that the base rate fallacy doesn’t affect attitudes 
such as belief and credence, but exclusively probability estimates. The fallacy is a specific kind of 
error occasionally affecting our probabilistic reasoning when we estimate probabilities (e.g., 
statistical frequencies) of certain events. According to Smith, forming a certain credence or belief 
about a given proposition “is not at all the same as trying to figure out how to assign probabilities to 																																																								
32 Bar-Hillel (1980); Kahneman & Tversky (1972); Lyon & Slovic (1976). More recently, in their tests psychologists have 
tended to avoid cases such as (Blue Bus Updated) for several reasons, some of which are outlined below. 
33 For example, according to Kohler, “[h]igh diagnostic information should have a greater impact on predictions, beliefs 
and attributions than less diagnostic information” and “[r]eliable evidence should have a greater impact on judgments 
than less-reliable evidence” (1996, pp. 8-9). 
34 See, e.g., Lyon & Slovic (1976).	
35 A reviewer proposes an alternative explanation of these data. The difference between (Blue Bus Updated) and Kate’s 
cases could be explained by an error theory. Assuming Buchak (2014)’s view that blame and attribution of responsibility 
are appropriate only when an agent has an outright belief, when presented with the (Blue Bus Updated) case people 
would think about who is to blame and reason as if they were asked to determine what to outright believe. For this 
reason, they would be more sensitive to non-statistical features of evidence in their interpretation of the case. We are not 
convinced by this explanation. For one thing, in the studies conducted by psychologists the questions posed to people 
unambiguously concern a partial doxastic attitude such as confidence. Given how the question is framed, it is objectively 
hard to confuse this with the further question what to outright believe. Moreover, the description of the case (poor 
visibility conditions, distance) clearly conveys that epistemic support is not enough to form an outright belief in the 
circumstance. A second worry with this explanation is that people tend to have exactly the same sort of intuitive 
judgments about cases in which blame is clearly not involved, such as in the Background color example. Finally, even 
assuming that this proposal provided an adequate explanation of the data, other things being equal, considerations of 
simplicity and unity would recommend avoiding an error theory postulating a systematic over-projection and questions’ 
misinterpretation in favor of alternative explanations not positing any judgmental error on the part of the tested 
subjects. 
	 17	
propositions” (ibid., p. 90). Credences and probability estimates involve different regulation 
processes and respond to different rationality standards. Even though there are important 
differences between our and Smith’s accounts of rational credence, Smith’s response to the base rate 
fallacy objection could apply equally well to our view. 
While the above considerations may be sufficient to bring home our point, we also think there is 
a further, more serious reason to resist attributing our intuitive judgments about cases considered in 
§3.1 to a systematic fallacy. This attribution would lead us to a dilemma. Either we provide 
completely different accounts of similar cases involving belief and credence (e.g., Blue-Green Bus in 
§2 and Blue Bus Updated in §3.1), or we adopt a common treatment. If we take the first horn, then 
we accept that qualitative differences in evidence matter for rational belief but not for rational 
credence. But then we are forced to accept the counterintuitive consequence that it is possible to 
completely divorce rational belief from rational confidence. This consequence, besides excluding the 
viability of any version of a Rational Threshold View, leads to many absurd results: first, it allows 
the possibility of rationally believing p while having a substantially low confidence that p, or even a 
stronger confidence that not-p.36 Second, assuming that it is rationally permissible to sincerely assert 
what one reasonably believes, it would be reasonable to sincerely assert odd-sounding sentences like 
“Jack is the murderer but I am not confident that he is”. Third, if justified belief involves a rational 
disposition to act on the believed proposition, then it may be perfectly rational for someone to act 
on a proposition that she reasonably takes to be false with a high degree of confidence. 
If, on the other hand, we take the second horn of the dilemma, we accept a co-variance of 
rational belief and credence in the relevant cases, in which case either both these attitudes are more 
sensitive to non-statistical than to statistical evidence or they are not. If the latter, then we have to 
assume that intuitive judgments in cases considered in §2, such as (Background Color) and the pair 
(Blue Bus)-(Green Bus), are systematically mistaken. Such kind of intuitive judgments do not have a 
purely academic interest. They are pervasive in many ordinary domains and sometimes play 
important roles in our lives and practices. For example, under prevailing legal practice and across a 
wide range of jurisdictions, mere statistical evidence is deemed insufficient to base a verdict of guilt 
or liability.37 Buchak (2014, §4) and Littlejohn (forthcoming) make similar considerations about the 
prominent role of non-statistical evidence as a basis for moral assessments of responsibility and 
blame. It is objectively hard to put all these patterns down to prejudices and biases. Are courtroom 																																																								
36 As Staffel observes, “[p]lausibly, an agent cannot rationally believe p unless she is very confident that p is true” (2016: 
p. 1722). Some philosophers divorce rational probability estimates and doxastic justification in this way, (e.g., Smith, 
2010, pp. 26-27; 2016, Ch.4; Cohen, 1981; Kaplan, 1995). However these views are far from standard. 
37 This has also been widely acknowledged by many philosophers, see e.g. Blome-Tillman (2015); Colyvan et al. (2001); 
Enoch et al. (2012); Moss (2018, Ch.10); Redmayne (2008); Smith (2010; 2016, §2.2); Thomson (1986). See Smith (2016 
§2.2, fn. 10) for a long list of real court cases in support of this claim.  
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decisions systematically biased when they refuse to condemn someone merely based on statistical 
considerations? For example, is it legitimate for a shoplifter to escape conviction on the basis of 
considerations about the relative frequency of honest shoppers in that area (Cohen, 1981, p. 329)? 
Should we believe guilty, blame and condemn a person for the fact that she belongs to a certain 
reference class most of whose members are guilty? While such a sort of systematic judgmental error 
is possible, both philosophers and psychologists consider this possibility with skepticism.38  
The alternative is to adopt explanations of the relevant cases preserving the special sensitivity of 
both rational belief and rational credence to non-statistical evidence. This latter option has the 
advantage of explaining the cases in ways compatible with our intuitive judgments. Furthermore, as 
we will see in the next section, this approach allows us to avoid the problem of statistical evidence 
for a modified version of the Rational Threshold View. 
 
 
4. Solving the problem of statistical evidence 
 
As we have seen in §2, the problem of statistical evidence undermines traditional versions of the 
Rational Threshold View. The problem emerges because, while a certain degree of rational 
credence may be sufficient to justify a belief in some cases, the same or higher degree is not 
sufficient in others. An important feature that such cases have in common is that, whenever 
evidence is insufficient to warrant an outright belief, non-statistical evidence is absent. In contrast, 
whenever it seems rational to form an outright belief, non-statistical evidence is available. 
Our main contention with critics of the Rational Threshold View is with the claim that rational 
belief and rational credence are sensitive to different features of evidence. If, as argued in §3, also 
rational credence is sensitive to the difference between statistical and non-statistical evidence, a 
necessary connection between belief and credence can be maintained. In particular, while 
circumstances in which only statistical evidence is available are such that rational credence can be 
very high but it is irrational to form an outright belief, when non-statistical evidence is also available 
both rational belief and rational credence are systematically more sensitive to non-statistical 
evidence. We may thus hypothesize that the two attitudes are tightly, structurally related in 
circumstances in which non-statistical evidence is available. 
Our proposal presupposes an account of the influence of different types of evidence on rational 
credence along the lines suggested in §3.1, involving a contextually variable sensitivity to statistical 																																																								
38 For similar conclusions in the psychological domain, see Barbey & Sloman (2007); Cohen (1981); Stanovich & West 
(2000) and open peer commentaries to these articles in the same volumes. To our knowledge, the only philosopher who 
explicitly endorses the systematic error hypothesis is Papineau (forthcoming).  
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evidence. The hypothesis is that the threshold is on the degree of rational credence provided that 
such credence is at least partially grounded in non-statistical evidence:  
 
(MRTV) There is a threshold t such that, if there is at least some non-statistical evidence for p 
available to a rational agent A, A believes p if and only if cr(p) ≥ t.39   
 
(MRTV) straightforwardly avoids the problem of statistical evidence. Assume that, as argued in 
§3, when both statistical and non-statistical evidence are available, statistical evidence receives a 
diminished weight in determining overall rational credence. In (Background Color), my credence 
that the laptop screen is blue is not grounded in non-statistical evidence, not even partially. 
Therefore, according to (MRTV), this credence cannot make an outright belief rational (no matter 
how high this credence is). On the contrary, Bruce, who has non-statistical evidence that the 
background is blue, can rationally believe it provided that its degree of rational credence reaches 
threshold t. According to (MRTV), since there is some relevant non-statistical evidence available to 
Bruce, and his overall degree of rational credence is quite high, he is rational to believe that the 
screen is blue. Similar explanations apply to other examples considered in §2.  
An important feature of this account is that when non-statistical evidence is available, actual 
rational credence can be influenced by statistical evidence only to a minor extent. Hence in such 
circumstances rational belief and rational credence are equally weakly sensitive to statistical 
evidence, and a variant of the threshold view can be maintained. However, when non-statistical 
evidence is absent, rational credence and rational belief take separate paths: while rational credence 
becomes strongly sensitive to statistical evidence, belief cannot be rationalised by any degree of 
merely statistically grounded credence, no matter how high. 
(MRTV) is compatible with statistical evidence exercising some influence on rational belief 
when both types of evidence are available. This is because (MRTV) sets the threshold on the degree 
of rational credence provided that such credence is at least partially grounded in non-statistical 
evidence, and, as suggested in §3, this degree is the result of a complex function taking into 
consideration both types of evidence, even though weighing them differently. This is a positive 																																																								
39 Smith (2010, p. 26; 2016, Ch.4) suggests a hybrid view according to which normic support specific of non-statistical 
evidence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justification. This view would be compatible with the claim that 
there is some evidential probability requirement upon justification. However, Smith rejects that view on the basis that it 
allows for violations of multiple premise closure for justification in risk-aggregating preface paradox cases. We do not 
consider these instances of closure failure a serious problem for our view, also because the intuitions underlying the 
preface paradox have been considered by many as supporting a Rational Threshold View and a problem for closure 
rather than the contrary (e.g., Christensen, 2004; Fantl & McGrath, 2009). An important aspect that distinguishes our 
account from that suggested by Smith is that, while in his mixed view epistemic justification requires two separate 
properties (normic support and high probability), our view requires a unique property, viz., a high degree of credence 
rationally supported by some non-statistical evidence. In our account, normic support is already built into rational 
credence partially grounded in non-statistical evidence.  
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feature of our account. Intuitively, statistical evidence can sometimes influence the strength of 
justification of an outright belief.40 For instance, statistical evidence confirming other available non-
statistical evidence may reinforce the rational confidence of the subject, and relatedly it may 
strengthen the degree of justification of a belief. That a DNA test indicates that the suspect was on 
the crime scene (statistical evidence), in combination with some other non-statistical evidence, can 
justify an outright belief that the suspect is guilty. We can conceive similar cases in which statistical 
evidence can lower one’s rational confidence even though this is supported by non-statistical 
considerations. 
Our view is also compatible with cases in which non-statistical evidence can decisively 
contribute to justify an outright belief or the suspension of judgment. An example of the former: 
DNA found at a crime scene in combination with some other non-statistical evidence can justify an 
outright belief that the suspect is guilty, while the mere non-statistical evidence would have been 
insufficient to grant this justification. 41 An example of the latter is a case in which the odds are so 
much against a proposition that non-statistical evidence that normally would suffice to justify a 
belief in that proposition is not sufficient to do that in the given circumstance. In this case, the 
statistical evidence is so strong that even after being partially screened off in the weight with non-
statistical evidence, it can still lower the degree of rational confidence to the point of justifying 
suspension of judgment. 
(MRTV) sets the threshold on the degree of rational credence provided that such credence is at 
least partially grounded in non-statistical evidence. A potential problem for our account concerns 
cases in which there is very strong statistical evidence in favor of p and very weak non-statistical 
evidence against p.  Even if the non-statistical evidence is weighted more heavily than the statistical 
evidence, if the difference between the two is sufficiently great, the rational credence in p could in 
principle reach the threshold for rational belief.  However, intuitively, in such cases it doesn’t seem 
rational to believe that p.42 We can think of three different responses to this challenge: first, one may 
argue that this type of circumstance is possible in principle, but so rare that it is never the case in 
practice. In order to have a case in which strong statistical evidence for p outweighs non-statistical 																																																								
40 Though some philosophers don’t share this intuition, e.g., Cohen (1981, p. 329). See Ross (forthcoming) for a recent 
defense of the rationalizing role of statistical evidence. 
41 In a similar vein, Gardiner (2019) and Ross (forthcoming, pp. 6-8) have recently argued that statistical evidence such 
as DNA profiling can play a decisive justificatory role in deciding legal verdicts, even though it may be insufficient in 
isolation. Similarly, Smith (2018, §4) suggests that DNA evidence should never be sufficient, in isolation, for a criminal 
conviction, but that it could make a decisive difference when combined with evidence of other kinds. However, we 
should also observe that other authors (Di Bello, 2019, §6; Krauss, 2020; Ross, forthcoming) have argued that DNA 
evidence could in isolation be sufficient to meet the criminal standard of proof. The present matter is complicated by 
two further issues: first, as we observed in fn.21, it is contentious whether DNA tests provide mere statistical evidence or 
also non-statistical evidence. Second, it is a matter of dispute whether the debate on standards for criminal conviction 
should be related to the epistemological issue of what it is rational to believe (Ross, forthcoming). 42	We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing our attention to this potential problem.	
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evidence against p to such an extent that it can reach the threshold for rational belief, we would 
need an absurdly high level of statistical support, one that we normally do not have. Second, we can 
avoid the problem if we conceive the weight between types of evidence as being such that the 
statistical support alone can never exceed the threshold for rational belief, no matter how large the 
disparity of evidential support between the two types of evidence. Third, we could slightly modify 
our proposal by assuming that it is not rational to believe p if there is not at least some (or 
preponderant) non-statistical evidence for p. The latter suggestion would fit well with how we have 
formulated (MRTV), as requiring at least some non-statistical evidence for p (not just some available 
non-statistical evidence). 
 
 
 
 
5. The aims of credence 
 
In §3, we have argued that rational credence is more sensitive to non-statistical evidence than to 
statistical evidence when both types of evidence are available. In §4, we have suggested a modified 
Rational Threshold View that can avoid the problem of statistical evidence by attributing a central 
role to non-statistical evidence in justifying outright belief. A natural question at this point is: why 
should belief and credence be more sensitive to non-statistical evidence than to evidence of a 
statistical kind? In this section we consider a possible answer to this question.  
A satisfactory answer should take into account the specific nature of non-statistical evidence. 
This type of evidence possesses specific causal, explanatory or modal connections with the 
propositions it supports. But why should such connections be relevant to justify doxastic attitudes? A 
relatively straightforward answer has been provided for outright belief: belief aims at knowledge.43 
Considerations about the mere probability of a proposition cannot grant the kind of evidential 
support necessary for knowledge. Some causal, explanatory or modal connection between the 
evidence and the supported proposition is also required.44 In this respect, a belief formed on the 
basis of mere statistical considerations is a somewhat defective belief, one that doesn’t aim at the 
specific support required for knowledge. Since that belief is guaranteed to fail to achieve its aim, it 
lacks justification. The aim of belief at knowledge can explain the special relation that belief has 
with assertion and rational action. The non-statistical grounds necessary for belief also explain why 
																																																								
43 The claim that knowledge is the aim or norm of belief has been defended by, amongst others, Adler (2002); Bird 
(2007); Huemer (2007); Littlejohn (2013; 2015); Peacocke (1999); Sutton (2007); Williamson (2000). 
44 For similar considerations, see e.g., Bird (2007, p. 102); Blome-Tillman (2017); Buchack (2014); Ichikawa (2014); 
Littlejohn (2015; forthcoming); Nelkin (2000); Smith (2016, §1.1); Staffel (2016). 
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this attitude can provide bases for reasonable responsibility, blame and praise attributions, while 
credence based on mere statistical evidence cannot.45  
If an explanation is available for why belief should be more sensitive to non-statistical evidence, 
one is still missing for credence. The case of credence is more complex than that of belief, since for 
credence the stronger sensitivity to non-statistical evidence occurs only when both statistical and 
non-statistical evidence are available. When non-statistical evidence is absent, rational credence is 
straightforwardly determined by statistical evidence, exactly matching the frequency in the relevant 
reference class. How can we explain this variable sensitivity of credence to statistical evidence in 
different circumstances?  
Our tentative suggestion is that credence has two aims or functions. The primary aim is to lead 
the subject to form beliefs. This can be achieved by reaching a level and quality of credence 
sufficient to constitute justified outright belief (and possibly knowledge). This goal motivates a 
qualitative selection of the information relevant for credence change, since belief requires a degree 
of credence meeting a certain threshold while at the same time being supported by evidence that 
maintains specific modal, causal or explanatory correlations with the supported proposition. This 
explains the asymmetrical role of statistical and non-statistical evidence in determining rational 
credence when both types of evidence are present. In short, credence aims at becoming a belief; 
belief aims at being knowledge; knowledge needs to be grounded in non-statistical evidence; 
therefore credence, in pursuing its primary aim, should be more sensitive to non-statistical evidence.  
Sometimes, however, the primary aim of credence cannot be achieved. This happens in 
circumstances in which non-statistical evidence is not available. The secondary aim of credence 
becomes operational in such circumstances. This aim is to minimize the risk of error by providing 
the best possible grounds for decisions in situations in which the available information is merely 
statistical, and thus not qualitatively sufficient to support a justified belief. In order to satisfy its 
secondary aim, credence must be sensitive to statistical considerations. When only statistical 
evidence is available, the best way to minimize the risk of error is to form credence exactly matching 
the objective or epistemic probability of that proposition. This secondary function of credence 
would respond to specific needs of agents in situations of partial information. For example, if 
someone must decide whether to buy or sell certain stock market shares and all her available 
evidence is an estimated probability of the future shares’ value based on frequency considerations, it 
is reasonable to rely in her decision on credence fully sensitive to the available statistical 
information. 
																																																								
45 Buchak (2014); Frankish (2009); Littlejohn (2015; forthcoming). 
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Some philosophers would here object that attributing asymmetrical weights to different types of 
evidence might sometimes increase the likelihood of arriving at false judgments.46 This might 
happen in some extreme cases in which strong statistical evidence contradicts non-statistical 
evidence. According to these philosophers, in such cases forming credences and beliefs in a way that 
strongly privileges non-statistical over statistical evidence would be irrational. We agree that in such 
extreme cases an asymmetrical weighting of different types of evidence might have detrimental 
consequences. If our hypothesis were correct, one would better avoid relying on her confidence and 
beliefs in matters in which it is particularly important to minimize risk—as suggested by some 
psychologists.47 However, this doesn’t imply that such an asymmetrical weighting of evidence is 
epistemically irrational and always (or even often) practically unreasonable; nor does it indicate that 
credence formation privileging non-statistical evidence over statistical evidence should be 
considered defective.  
In our view, these philosophers commit the mistake of excessively focusing on the secondary 
aim of credence, tending to ignore the primary aim of such attitudes. They assume that the only or 
the most fundamental cognitive goal of credence is a certain type of risk minimizing accuracy, 
ignoring other fundamental cognitive and epistemic aims, most notably the aim at knowledge. For 
this reason, their approaches to doxastic rationality are only partially correct. While they 
legitimately apply to contexts in which knowledge is not an achievable goal, they are more doubtful 
when qualitative features of available evidence allow for hoping to achieve rational belief (and 
eventually knowledge). In such contexts, mere risk-minimization accuracy is no longer an 
appropriate means to achieve that goal. Since knowledge requires robust causal, explanatory and 
counterfactual connections between the evidence and the believed proposition, only evidence 
possessing such features would constitute an appropriate means to achieve that goal. This doesn’t 
mean that we should sacrifice accuracy for other epistemic goals. Rather, we should recognize two 
different kinds of accuracy, each having its respective role in our doxastic life: a risk-minimization, 
quantitative accuracy, and a knowledge-centered accuracy, more sensitive to the safety and 
goodness of causal and explanatory grounds of the attitude.48 Far from depicting an irrational 
model of our doxastic attitudes, an account of credence taking into account qualitative features of 
evidence would be in a position to explain most of our intuitive judgments about these attitudes, 
																																																								
46 E.g., Papineau (forthcoming). 
47 For representative lists see references in Cohen (1981, p. 317) and Stanovich & West (2000, pp. 645-646). 
48 This doesn’t contradict a characterization of accuracy in terms of “closeness to the truth” (e.g., Weisberg, 2015, p. 
818). One may be closer to the truth in the sense of having attitudes more likely to be true; but in another, qualitative 
sense one is “closer” to the truth when one possesses that truth, i.e., knows it.  
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while at the same time preserving stable and intuitive connections between confidence, belief and 
knowledge.49 
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